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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times, the nation's third most
widely circulated newspaper,' splashed a front-page story about the U.S.
Government's then-secret "Terrorist Surveillance Program."2 In the story,
the New York Times alleged that, for almost four years, the President
secretly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to "eavesdrop on
Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of
terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily
required. . . ."' These accusations were so incisive, and the ensuing
political firestorm was so intense, that President Bush responded the very
next morning by delivering a live seven-minute television address
(foregoing his more traditional radio address).4 In his address, the
President acknowledged that he authorized this program that was "crucial
to our national security." 5
In the months that followed after the New York Times disclosure, the
President and Congress engaged in a rigorous debate about the proper
scope of government authority to engage in domestic electronic
surveillance, absent a warrant or court order.6 The Bush administration
defended the program by arguing that the program was lawful from both
a constitutional and statutory perspective.7 In particular, the Bush
administration asserted that the program was a necessary incident of war,
and as Commander in Chief, the President had the inherent authority to
engage in and execute all incidents of war.'

1. See Audit Bureau ofCirculations, Top 200Newspapers by LargestReportedCirculation,
availableat http://www.accessabc.com/products/top200.htm (last visited July 19, 2007).
2. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
3. Id.
4. See White House Radio, President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, The Reach of War: The President,Facing Tough Questions,
Bush Defends War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A8; see also Andrea Stone, List Describes 30
Briefings on NSA Work, USA TODAY, May 18,2006, at 5A; Greg Miller & Joseph Menn, President
Backs Off Wiretap Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at Al.
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006)
[hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE]; see also Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and

General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, Dec. 19, 2005,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1 .html.
8. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supranote 7, at 2.
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In opposition, various academic, congressional, and political leaders
argued that Congress retained exclusive authority over domestic electronic
surveillance. These congressional proponents argued that the President
could only conduct domestic surveillance pursuant to the contours of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 9 FISA provides a statutory
framework for the use of electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen
registers, and trap and trace devices to acquire foreign intelligence
information."° The Bush administration responded that FISA was obsolete
and lacked the speed and agility to deal with modem terrorists. 1
In Spring 2006, while the power grab between the President and
Congress was unfolding, the federal courts were unwittingly thrust into the
controversy. At that time, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
brought suit in the Eastern District of Michigan to enjoin the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, on grounds that the government's actions violated
the U.S. Constitution and other statutory provisions.12 In a sharp (and
surprising) rebuke to the President, District Court Judge Anna Diggs
Taylor sided with the ACLU, holding that the Terrorist Surveillance
Program violated the Administrative Procedures Act, the Separation of
Powers doctrine, the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution, FISA, and title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act. 3 Given the problems with the President's surveillance
program, Judge Taylor permanently enjoined the program. 4 Judge
Taylor's decision was ultimately reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, with the court holding 2-1 that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring suit because the plaintiffs could not prove that the NSA actually
intercepted their communications.15
Against this backdrop, the legality of the President's program was still
somewhat unclear in fall 2006. Given this uncertainty, several members
of the 109th Congress proposed legislation aimed at striking the proper
constitutional balance between the President and Congress in domestic
electronic surveillance. 16 Because these bills were introduced in late 2006,

9. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006).
10. See id.
11. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supranote 7, at 34.
12. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
13. Id. at 782.
14. Id.
15. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
16. In addition to the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act (ESMA, the bill that is the
focus of this Article), three competing bills were proposed in the U.S. Senate: the Terrorist
Surveillance Act of2006, S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposed by Senator DeWine); the National
Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposed by Senator Specter); and
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just weeks before the congressional elections, debate on legislation was
minimal, and Congress was ultimately unable to pass any legislation
related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program. 7 Nonetheless, one bill, the
Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act (ESMA), 8 did receive
considerable deliberation and passed the House of Representatives by a
majority vote.' 9 ESMA proposed amending the current FISA framework,
in hopes of retaining some congressional oversight, while also allowing
the President added flexibility in engaging in domestic electronic
surveillance. While the Senate adjourned without passing the bill, ESMA
is nevertheless important as it offers one approach into balancing the need
to acquire foreign intelligence information with the need for independent
oversight. A future Congress might be interested in revisiting the ESMA
framework, and, as such, analysis on the bill is useful.
It is important to note that, after the 2006 elections, the Bush
administration backed away from the Terrorist Surveillance Program and
now avows that it will not use the Program in the future. 20 This presidential
acquiescence might render the ESMA, or any similar bill, as moot.
Nonetheless, a future Congress might still be inclined to visit the issue of

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3001, 109th
Cong. (2006) (proposed by both Senators Specter and Feinstein). Each of these bills proposed
broader statutory authority for electronic surveillance, while also subjecting the surveillance to
specific statutory restrictions.
17. Tom Brune, Congress Unlikely to Deal with WiretapFlap Until '07, NEwSDAY, Dec. 1,
2006, at A26.
18. ESMA, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (2006).
19. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-451 (2006).
The Committee on the judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security held two hearings on H.R. 5825 on the 6th and 12th of
September 2006. On September 20,2006, the Committee met in open session and
ordered favorably reported the bill, H.R. 5825, with an amendment, by roll call
vote with 20 ayes and 16 nays, a quorum being present. The bill was reported to
the House on November 29, 2001 (H. Rept. 109-630, Part II). The House passed
the bill on September 28, 2006, by a recorded vote (Roll No. 502) of 232 yeas to
191 nays. No further action was taken on the bill, H.R. 3209, during the 109th
Congress.
Id.
20. In particular, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez informed U.S. Senate leaders on
January 17, 2007, that the President chose not to reauthorize the Program and "any electronic
surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will now be conducted
subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." Letter from Attorney
General Alberto Gonzalez to the Honorable Patrick Leahy and the Honorable Arlan Specter (Jan.
17, 2007) (on file with author).
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domestic electronic surveillance, given the controversy that immediately
ensued in late 2005.
This Article proceeds in Part II by analyzing the specific intentions and
goals ESMA. In addition to analyzing the ESMA framework, Part II
compares the ESMA apparatus to the pre-existing FISA structure. Part III
then critiques several aspects of ESMA, offering commentary on the
possible shortcomings of the proposed legislation. In particular, Part III
takes issue with the bill's broad definitional modifications, the excessive
deference given to the President, and the lack of meaningful congressional
oversight. The Article concludes in Part IV by offering some final
comments on the future of domestic electronic surveillance and the need
for Congress to be vigilant, yet flexible, in policing this arena.
II. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
MODERNIZATION ACT

(ESMA)

While the text of the ESMA has eleven distinct sections, the bill
effectively accomplishes five tasks: modifying definitional phrases within
the FISA framework; authorizing the President to issue directives to third
parties; streamlining the requirements to obtain a court order for electronic
surveillance; granting the President discretion to engage in emergency
surveillance in specific cases; and supplementing congressional oversight
over electronic surveillance. Each of these objectives is considered below.
A. Modification of Key FISA Definitions
Section 2 of ESMA amends five of the current definitions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The need for such modifications
was expressed in the Report by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence: "[T]he current legal and technical framework relative to FISA
was construed in 1978. The complexity, variety and means of
communications technology has since mushroomed exponentially and
globally-but the structure of our surveillance laws has remained
hidebound around the technology of generations-old wired telephones. "21
To this end, ESMA proposed amendments to the phrases "agent of a
foreign power," "electronic surveillance," "minimization procedures,"

21. H.R. REP. No. 109-680, at 8 (2006).
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and "wire communication" and "surveillance device. 22 Each modification
is presented below.
Section 2(a) of ESMA amends the definition of "agent of a foreign
power" by adding a new category of people who could be considered
agents of a foreign power. In particular, this new category extends to any
person, other than a "United States person,"23 who "is reasonably expected
to possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information
while such person is in the United States, provided that the official making
the certification ... deems such foreign intelligence information to be
significant., 24 This new category is similar to the "lone wolf' provision in
subsection 101(b)(1)(C) of FISA,25 in that the person need not have any
connection with a foreign power to be considered an "agent of a foreign
power., 26 Given the ambiguity of this phrase, one might wonder whether
this new definition will portend a much greater reach for the revised FISA.
This is a legitimate concern, and is discussed below.27
Section 2(b) amends the definition of "electronic surveillance" in FISA
to mean:
(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device for acquiring information by intentionally
directing surveillance at a particular known person who is
reasonably believed to be in the United States, under
circumstances in which that person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes; or

22. ESMA also modifies the definition of "contents" to mean "any information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."
23. A "United States person" is defined under subsection 101(i) of FISA, codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2006).
24. ESMA, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2006).
25. Subsection 101(b)(1)(C) describes a non-U.S. person "who engages in international
terrorism or activities in preparation [for international terrorism]." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(l)(C)

(2006).
26. It is worth noting that, under ESMA, the President would be able to "authorize electronic
surveillance without a court order.., for periods of up to one year.. . if the electronic surveillance
is directed at acquisition of the contents of communications of... an 'agent of a foreign power."'
Importantly, under ESMA, this surveillance would be appropriate, even if there was a "likelihood
that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communications to which a United States
person [was] a party." Specifically, Section (3) of ESMA eliminated the FISA requirement that
surveillance involve "no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any

communications to which a United States person [was] a party." CRS Report for Congress.
27. See infra Part III(a).
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(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, if both the sender and all intended
recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the
United States.28
This proposed definition of electronic surveillance is similar to the
current FISA definition, 29 although there are some key distinctions.
Subsection 1 of the new definition essentially merges elements from
current subsections 101(f)(1), 101(f)(2), and 101(f)(4).30 Thus, this
subsection would mean that electronic surveillance encompasses the
acquisition of any information (whether it be content or not) obtained by
a surveillance device that is intentionally targeted towards anyone
28. H.R. 5825 § 2(b) (as passed by the House of Representatives, July 18, 2006).
29. The current definition of "electronic surveillance" is articulated in subsection 101(f) of
FISA, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0 (2006). The current definition of electronic surveillance is:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be
received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United
States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United
States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes;
the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United
States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs
in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those
communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under
section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18;
the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both
the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States;
or
the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than
from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes.

30. CompareH.R. 5825 § (2)(b)(1), and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0(104) (2006).
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"reasonably believed to be in the United States."'" This proposed
definition is slightly different then the current framework in three regards.
First, under the current provisions, there is a slight distinction between
surveillance directed towards U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons
(dependent also on whether the surveillance takes place within the United
States).32 This distinction is eradicated under ESMA. Second, FISA
currently defines electronic surveillance as the intentional targeting of
anyone in the United States. Under ESMA, electronic surveillance would
be broadened to mean the intentional targeting of anyone "reasonably
believed to be in the United States." Third, the current definition does
away with any technology-specific references. Conversely, under FISA,
there are distinctions between wire and radio communications and other
types of communications.
The second part of the revised "electronic surveillance" definition
mirrors current FISA definition 10 1(f)(3), with two minor modifications.
First, ESMA's definition is not limited to radio communications, but rather
extends to "any communication."33 This is consistent with the bill's
technology-neutral approach. Second, while current subsection 101 (f)(3)
covers those communications where the sender and the intended recipients
are "located within the United States,"34 the proposed definition would
apply when the sender and the intended recipients are "reasonably believed
to be located within the United States."35 Thus, a reasonable belief that
either the sender or the intended recipient is in the United States will
render the acquisition as "electronic surveillance" (thereby, governed by
FISA).
Subsection 2(c)(3) of ESMA modifies the definition of "minimization
procedures" by removing subsection (4) of FISA's minimization
procedures definition.36 Subsection (4) of the current FISA specifies that,
as part of the minimization procedures, "no contents of any
communication to which a United States person is a party shall be

31. See supra note 29.
32. The distinction occurs in subsections 101(f)(1) and 101 (f)(2).Under subsection 101(f)(1),
electronic surveillance means the acquisition of any wire or radio communications sent or intended
to be received by a known U.S. person. Subsection 101 (0(2) provides that electronic surveillance
is the acquisition within the United States of either U.S. or non-U.S. persons' communications.
Proposed subsection 101(f)(1) would cover the acquisition of any person's communication,
regardless of whether the acquisition occurs within the United States. Id.
33. H.R. 5825 § (2)(b)(2).
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0(3) (2006).
35. H.R. 5825 § (2)(b)(2).
36. FISA's minimization procedures are codified in subsection 101 (h), codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(h) (2006).
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disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer
than 72 hours . . . . , Thus, under ESMA, information obtained via
electronic surveillance is no longer limited to a three day dissemination
period; rather, this information can be shared indefinitely, subject to the
remaining minimization procedures.
Lastly, section 2(d) of ESMA eliminates all of FISA's references to
"wire communication ' 38 and instead uses the phrase "surveillance
device. 3 9 Surveillance device is interpreted to mean "a device that allows
surveillance by the Federal Government, but excludes any device that
extracts or analyzes information from data that already has been acquired
by the Federal Government by lawful means."4' Like the revision to
"electronic surveillance," this definition is broader than its predecessor in
that it envisions a technology-neutral definition of surveillance. 4 '
B. Authorizationfor the Attorney General to Issue ForeignIntelligence
Information Directives to Others
ESMA creates a new provision within FISA that allows the Attorney
General to require "any person with authorized access to electronic
communications or equipment used to transmit or store electronic
communications to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance
necessary to accomplish electronic surveillance ... '42 This provision is
similar, albeit somewhat distinct, from FISA subsection 102(a)(4).43
Section 102(a)(4) of FISA allows the Attorney General to "direct a
specified communication common carrier to (A) furnish all information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the electronic
surveillance... ." ESMA's provisions are broader than the current FISA

37. Id. § 1801(H)(4).
38. "Wire communication" is defined under FISA to mean "any communication while it is
being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications." See subsection 101(I) of FISA, codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1801 (l) (2006).
39. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, as
Passed by the House of Representatives (RL33637; Jan. 18, 2007), by Elizabeth Bazan, at 8
[hereinafter U.S. Congressional Research Service].
40. Id.
41. For comparison, the definition of "wire communication" under the pre-existing FISA
means "any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection
furnished or operated by any person..." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(l) (2006).
42. ESMA, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2006).
43. Codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(4) (2006).
44. Id.
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provisions in that the Attorney General can issue this directive to anyone
(as opposed to just communication common carriers).45 In addition, ESMA
is broader than FISA in that ESMA explicitly identifies ways that the
government can compel compliance. Specifically, the Attorney General
can compel compliance through petitions to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). 4 6 The FISC is directed to compel an individual
to act if the directive was lawful and issued pursuant to the ESMA statute.
If an individual wishes to challenge the directive, this challenge can
succeed only if the FISC judge finds that the directive does not meet the
requirements of the Act or is otherwise unlawful;47 all other challenges to
the directive must fail.4" Failure to comply with an Attorney General
directive may be punished as contempt of court.4 9
In addition to specifying the procedures to mandate compliance, ESMA
specifies that information obtained via a directive can be disclosed for law
enforcement purposes if the Attorney General gives advance
authorization.5" This comports with existing FISA caveat provisions. 5
C. Revision of the Requirements Fora Court Orderfor
ElectronicSurveillance
Additionally, ESMA makes it easier for the Attorney General to
receive a FISC court order for electronic surveillance. In particular,
Section 5(1) of ESMA would amend FISA so that the Attorney General
would only need to submit to the FISC court a summary statement of
certain facts, rather than a detailedstatement. For example, under ESMA,
the Attorney General would no longer need to present "a detailed
description of the nature of the information sought and the type of

45. Id.
46. See generally H.R. 5825 § (3)(a); see also U.S. Congressional Research Service, supra
note 39.
47. U.S. Congressional Research Service, supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. H.R. 5825 § 3(a) amended section 102 by inserting section 102B(j): "[n]o information
acquired pursuant to this section shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such
disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived from
such information, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the
Attorney General."
51. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (2006) ("No information acquired pursuant to this
subchapter shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied
by a statement that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in
a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General.").
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communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance. 52 Rather,
a summary statement of this information would be sufficient. Similarly, a
request to the FISC court now need only include a summary "statement of
the means by which the surveillance will be effected and a statement
whether physical entry is required to effect the surveillance. 53 As well,
under ESMA, the FISC court order request only needs a summary
"statement of the facts concerning all previous applications that have been
made to any judge under this subchapter involving any of the persons,
facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken on
each previous application."54
In addition to reducing the requirements of an application for a court
order, ESMA slightly redefines the necessary findings that a FISC judge
must make in order to approve an electronic surveillance request. In
particular, Section 6(1) of ESMA specifies that a judge no longer needs to
find that "the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve
applications for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
information."55 More critically, though, in cases where more than one
surveillance device is used, ESMA would no longer require a FISC judge
to specify "the authorized coverage of the devices involved and what
minimization procedures shall apply to information subject to acquisition
by each device."56 Thus, a FISC order need not explicitly identify the
specific forms of surveillance and the individual minimization procedures.
This is consistent with the goals of creating a technology-neutral
surveillance apparatus.
The most significant modification to the FISC order process is an
ESMA provision that allows a FISC judge to extend an order for electronic
surveillance. Currently under FISA, a judge can extend an order for
electronic surveillance for ninety days, subject to two limitations.57 The
first exception applies when the order is targeting "a foreign-based
political organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons" or "an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign
government or governments."" In these cases, a judge can extend the
surveillance order only "if the judge finds probable cause to believe that
no communication of any individual United States person will be acquired

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

This current requirement is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2006).
H.R. 5825 § 5(C).
Id. § 5(D).
Id. § 6(1).
Id. § 6(2)(C).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(2) (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1) (2006).
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during the period."59 The second exception applies when the order is
targeting a non-U.S. person who "acts in the United States as an officer or
employee of a foreign power." These exceptions permit "an extension of
an order.., for a period not to exceed 1 year."6' ESMA would eliminate
both exceptions and allow extensions of all FISA orders for "a period not
to exceed one year," even if there is probable cause that the
communication of a United States person might be acquired.6 This is a
significant modification to the existing FISA framework.
D. Authorization of Limited Emergency Surveillance Without
Court Order
ESMA envisions a system of expansive discretion for executive branch
officials to engage in emergency surveillance without a court order. For
example, section 6(6) of ESMA modifies the "emergency order"
requirement of FISA, and allows the Attorney General to authorize
emergency employment of electronic surveillance for one week if specific
requirements are met. In particular, under ESMA, the Attorney General
could authorize emergency surveillance if he: (1) determines that an
emergency situation exists; (2) determines that a factual basis for a FISC
order exists; (3) informs a FISC judge of his decision; and (4) makes an
application pursuant to FISA within one week of such emergency
surveillance.62 While the current FISA framework has a similar framework
for emergency surveillance, there are two key differences. First, the
present FISA statute requires the Attorney General to file an application
for a FISC order within 72 hours, rather than 168 hours specified in
ESMA. Second, the current FISA requires that the Attorney General's
determinations of the emergency situation and factual basis be
"reasonable. 63 This reasonableness requirement is removed from ESMA.
Similarly, ESMA would amend section 11 of FISA, which allows for
warrantless electronic surveillance and physical searches to acquire foreign
intelligence information for a "period not to exceed 15 calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress."' Under ESMA, the
President would be able to authorize electronic surveillance and physical
searches to acquire foreign intelligence information without a court order
"for a period not to exceed 90 days following an armed attack against the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(2)(A) (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(2)(B) (2006).
See H.R. 5825 § 6(5).
See id. § 6(6).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
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territory of the United States.... "65 This amendment not only prolongs the
duration of warrantless surveillance/searches (from 15 days to 90), but it
also lowers the threshold required to trigger this emergency surveillance
(from a congressional declaration of war to an "armed attack against the
territory of the United States").
In addition to these amendments, ESMA would add a new section to
FISA which would allow the President to engage in electronic surveillance
without a FISC order to acquire foreign intelligence information "for a
period of up to 90 days following a terrorist attack against the United
States.... "66 The President could extend this time duration by submitting
a certification to a congressional intelligence committee that wireless
electronic surveillance is still required.67 This proposed section envisions
electronic surveillance of individuals, including U.S. persons. When the
President wishes to pursue surveillance of a U.S. person, he is limited to
a sixty day window unless he submits a certification to a congressional
intelligence committee that "the continued electronic surveillance of the
68
United States person is vital to the national security of the United States.,
Similarly, section 14 of ESMA would allow similar warrantless
surveillance for ninety days when the President submits a written
notification that he "determined that there exists an imminent threat of
attack likely to cause death, serious injury, or substantial economic
damage to the United States., 69 Again, the President can extend this
warrantless surveillance period every ninety days thereafter as long as he
submits subsequent written notification.7"

65. See H.R. 5825 § 12(a).
66. See id. § 13.
67. Id.
68. Id.ESMA also requires that the President describe the circumstances that have prevented
acquisition of a court order, the reasons for believing the U.S. person is affiliated with a terrorist
organization, and the foreign intelligence information derived from the surveillance.
69. See H.R. 5825 § (14). Section 14 would require the President to notify the congressional
leadership, the congressional intelligence committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court within five days of the presidential authorization. The President must
specify the entity responsible for the threat and any affiliates of the entity;... the
reason to believe that the threat of imminent attack exists; . . . the reason the
President needs broader authority to conduct electronic surveillance... ;... a
description of the foreign intelligence information that will be collected and the
means that will be used to collect such foreign intelligence information.
Id.Additionally, the President may submit this report in classified form.
70. Id.
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E. Revision of CongressionalOversightProvisions
One of the express goals of ESMA is to provide greater congressional
oversight to the President's use of domestic surveillance. ESMA envisions
a greater role for Congress in several ways. First, ESMA would require
that, semiannually, the Attorney General "fully inform the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance
conducted without a court order."'" Currently, there is no statutory
requirement mandating this report to Congress.
Second, ESMA would enhance congressional oversight by amending
the National Security Act of 1947.72 In particular, ESMA would amend
section 413 of the Act to affirmatively allow the Chair of each of the
congressional intelligence committee to inform, on a bipartisan basis, "all
members or any individual members of such committee, and any essential
staff of such committee" of a report submitted under 50 U.S.C. §§ 413(a)
or (b) ("Reporting of intelligence activities other than covert actions,"
"Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions").73 Similarly,
ESMA would amend sections 413(a) and 413(b) to allow for similar
sharing and consultation among congressional intelligence committees.
This replaces the current system where only the Chair and Vice-Chair
receive this information. Ostensibly, ESMA's drafters included these
provisions to ensure bipartisan information exchange.
Il. SHORTCOMINGS OF ESMA
While the goals of ESMA (namely, modernizing FISA and enhancing
congressional oversight over the process) are laudable, there are several
reasons to have misgivings about the current ESMA framework.
Specifically, the bill appears to suffer from significantly deceptively
ambiguous phrases, excessive delegation to the President, and inadequate
congressional oversight provisions. Each of these objections are
considered in turn.

71. H.R. 5825 § 8(a)(2).
72. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
73. H.R. 5825 § 8(f).
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A. ESMA 's Definition Modifications Are Deceptively Ambiguous and
Create the Possibility ofAbuse
While section 2 of ESMA does make meaningful strides in updating
certain terms in FISA, several of the definition modifications are overly
ambiguous, and create a situation where executive officials could easily
subvert the goals of Congress. In this regard, there are two definitions to
be particularly concerned with: the change to an "agent of a foreign
power" and "electronic surveillance."
With regard the change of the first definition, ESMA seeks to add a
new category of people to the "agent of foreign power" category.74
Specifically, under ESMA, a person who "is reasonably expected to
possess, control, transmit, or receive foreign intelligence information while
such person is in the United States" is now considered an "agent of a
foreign power."75
This broad reach should be troubling because a reasonable expectation
that a non-U.S. person will possess significant foreign intelligence
information, without anything more, will be enough to deem a person an
"agent of a foreign power." This definition does not require any action or
intention by the person. Rather, any time a non-U.S. person is expected to
possess foreign intelligence information, he can be deemed an "agent of
a foreign power." This broad definition is in stark contrast to the other
definitions of an "agent of a foreign power," all of which require some
affirmative action by the person.7 6 It is unclear whether Congress truly
intended to broaden the definition of an "agent of a foreign power" so
expansively.
Nonetheless, whether it was intentional or not, a future Congress
should reconsider this definition of an "agent of a foreign power." While
it would be helpful to include a provision that targets those individuals
transmitting or controlling foreign intelligent information, the provision
should be more narrowly tailored and should be triggered only when the
individual engages in some affirmative action.
The second definitional change is equally troubling. Under ESMA,
"electronic surveillance" would now mean either:

74. See supra Part II(a).
75. H.R. 5825 § 2(a).
76. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2006). A
person can be an agent of a foreign power if he: "(A) acts in the United States as an officer or
employee of a foreign power... ; (B) actsfor or on behalfof a foreign power which engages in
clandestine intelligence activities ...; or (C) engages in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore" (emphasis added). All of these definitions require some affirmative action
before the person can be labeled an "agent of a foreign power." Id.
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1. the installation or use of a surveillance device for acquiring
information by intentionally directing surveillance at a particular
known person who is reasonably believed to be in the United
States, under circumstances in which that person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes; or
2. the intentional acquisition of the contents of any communication
under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, if both the sender and all intended
recipients are reasonably believed to be located within the
United States.
This definition should be troubling for several reasons. First, under this
new definition, any time that a person in the United States (who has a
reasonable expectation of privacy) communicates with another person who
is outside of the United States, the interception of the contents of the
communication would not be considered "electronic surveillance" (and
thus would not receive FISA's protections). This definition of electronic
surveillance is narrower than the current FISA definition, in that the FISA
definition defines "electronic surveillance" as the "acquisition ...of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United
States."77 Thus, to fall under the gambit of electronic surveillance under
ESMA (and thereby receive FISA's protections), both the sender and the
recipient must be in the United States. Thus, ESMA might potentially
portend an evisceration of privacy for international communications.
Both of these definitional modifications are particularly expansive.
Modifications that change almost thirty years ofpractice and jurisprudence
should be done with care and caution. Thus, a future Congress would be
well served by reconsidering and narrowing these definitional
modifications.
B. The Emergency Surveillance Provisions Vest Excessive
Discretion in the Executive Branch
An equally troubling problem with ESMA is the bill's seemingly
unfettered discretion to the President. In various provisions, ESMA places
blind reliance in the President to determine when electronic surveillance
can proceed without an order from the FISC court. For example, section

77. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0 (2006) (emphasis added).
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14 of ESMA would create a new section in FISA to allow the President to
engage in warrantless surveillance for ninety days whenever the President
submits a written notification that he has "determined that there exists an
imminent threat of attack likely to cause death, serious injury, or
substantial economic damage to the United States. 78 The President can
extend this warrantless surveillance period every ninety days thereafter as
long as he submits subsequent written notification. While section 14 would
require the President to notify the congressional leadership, the
congressional intelligence committees, and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court within five days of his engaging in warrantless
surveillance, there is little that Congress can do to stop the President from
engaging in warrantless surveillance once the President makes this
notification.
Concededly, the ESMA tries to mitigate against unfettered presidential
discretion by requiring the President to "specify the entity responsible for
the threat and any affiliates of the entity; ... the reason to believe that the
threat of imminent attack exists;.., the reason the President needs broader
authority to conduct electronic surveillance... ; ... a description of the

foreign intelligence information that will be collected and the means that
will be used to collect such foreign intelligence information. 7 9 However,
once the President submits this requisite notification, he is statutorily
empowered to engage in unfettered and unchecked domestic warrantless
surveillance without a court order. In this regard, there appears to be no
recourse for Congress to challenge the President's determination, unless
Congress can somehow show the President's determination was
unreasonable. Yet, because the President will likely possess far superior
information about overseas terrorist threats, Congress will likely be unable
to surmount a formidable challenge to Presidential action.
Admittedly, even the original FISA deferred to the executive branch on
many occasions. For example, the current version of FISA allows the
Attorney General to certify the need for temporary emergency
surveillance.8" Additionally, the current FISA allows the President to
acquire foreign intelligence information without a court order for the 15
calendar days following a declaration of war. 8 Yet, ESMA significantly
expands upon the already present Presidential discretion. For example,
under ESMA, the Attorney General could certify the need for temporary
emergency surveillance for 7 days, rather than 3 days. Moreover, under

78.
79.
80.
81.

H.R. 5825 § 14.
See id.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2006).
See5OU.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
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Attorney General's certification no longer needs to be
ESMA, the 82
"reasonable." Additionally, while the President was able to engage in
warrantless surveillance for 15 days after a declaration of war by the
Congress, now the President can engage in warrantless surveillance for 90
days after the Presidentdetermines an armed attack against the territory
of the United States has occurred. These modifications significantly
distort, rather than balance, the discretion in favor of the President.
C. ESMA Failsto Grant Congress a Meaningful Role in
Domestic Surveillance
Further compounding the problems of ESMA is the fact that the bill
does relatively little to ensure a meaningful role for Congress in policing
the arena of domestic electronic surveillance. While one of the express
goals of the bill was to bolster congressional oversight, the bill does little
other than to modestly disseminate information to members of the
congressional leadership.
To be sure, proposals aimed at maximizing information dissemination
are abundant throughout the bill. For example, section 8 of ESMA would
require the Attorney General to semiannually "fully inform the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on electronic surveillance
conducted without a court order."83 Further, other proposals in the bill
would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to allow the chairmen of
relevant intelligence committees to exchange and disseminate information
to other members (and appropriate staff) of the committee.'
While information disclosure is laudable (indeed, Justice Brandeis once
noted, "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman"85 ), mere disclosure (and nothing else)
amounts to a relatively modest congressional power. Indeed, one need look
no further than the controversy that emerged with the "Terrorist
Surveillance Program" to see the inadequacy of congressional notification.
There, despite annual briefings to Congress, the President engaged in
domestic surveillance, without a warrant, for six years from 2001 to 2007
(even in the face of immense congressional opposition after the New York

82. See supratext accompanying note 63.
83. H.R. 5825 § 8(2).
84. See id. § 8.
85. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62

(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914).
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Times disclosed the program in December 2005).86 Further, it is unclear
whether information dissemination to the full intelligence committee (as
opposed to just the Chair and Vice-Chair) will make a meaningful
difference.
A more meaningful role for Congress could be preserved by allowing
select congressional intelligence committees, and not the President, to
determine when warrantless domestic emergency surveillance is
appropriate. Forcing these congressional committees, rather than the
President, to determine when to engage in warrantless electronic
surveillance will necessarily create a "second sobering moment" and will
require majoritian support. While one might argue that Congress may lack
classified information about pending terrorist threats, there is no reason to
believe that the President could not brief and persuade Congress to
authorize warrantless surveillance without compromising sensitive
information. Furthermore, in response to the claim that Congress often
moves too slowly, the fear of congressional inefficiency should be
militated when we speak of 15 member congressional committees (as
opposed to 535 members of the full Congress). This proposal, for example,
would more faithfully ensure a robust separation of powers framework.
IV. CONCLUSION

As the rigorous 2006 debate about the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program" illustrated, domestic surveillance programs invoke two strong
(and often competing) values: individual liberty and national security. It
is difficult for these values to exist in concert with one another since
programs that aim to bolster "national security" often infringe civil
liberties for the good of the nation. Moreover, trying to resolve the tension
between these values is necessarily arduous since it is hard to measure
which value "matters more." In this regard, Justice Scalia is probably
correct when he noted that value "balancing tests" are akin to "judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."87 There
is simply no objective way to make this comparison.
Further complicating the problem is the constantly changing nature of
domestic surveillance. As the 1978 incarnation of FISA demonstrates,
technology often changes in dramatic ways, and it is difficult to ex ante

86. See Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, How theAdministrationExpandedIts Spying Powers,
WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2007, at B 1.

87. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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police "acceptable" and "unacceptable" lines of surveillance. Additionally,
as the attacks of September 11th profoundly illustrated, the nature of
terrorist threats evolve as well, and efforts to respond to terrorism often
will require innovative tools.
While it will never be easy for a legislature to create prospective rules
about constantly evolving problems, the difficulty of the task should not
imply that the legislature ought to grant unfettered discretion to the
President. Instead, the difficulty inherent in the problem underscores the
need for a considered, deliberate, and measured framework. While FISA
and ESMA are helpful "guideposts" in this framework, FISA and ESMA
should be recognized as the starting-points, rather than the end-points.
Thus, a future Congress ought to revisit and improve upon ESMA.
In this vein, Congress ought to consider moderate, incremental efforts
to maximize FISA's responsive flexibility, while also preserving the core
civil liberty protections embedded in FISA. One proposal suggested in this
Article is to vest the authorization of "emergency domestic surveillance"
powers in a congressional intelligence committee, rather than in the hands
of the President. This purposeful effort to infuse friction in the domestic
surveillance program will hopefully impose a "second sobering thought."
Similarly, other proposals that embrace a role for both the President and
the Congress could reconcile domestic surveillance with individual
privacy.
Through revisiting FISA and ESMA, one can hope that Congress
improves upon its previous laudable work. In this regard, the current
generation of congressional representatives (all of whom witnessed the
horrors of terrorism and heard subsequent claims about the need to
preserve individual liberties) are not only uniquely positioned, but also
directly responsible, for striking a better balance between the oftencontentious conflict between individual liberties and national security.

